- Author: James Albrecht, Pieter A. Gautier, and Susan Vroman
- Speaker: James Albrecht (Georgetown University)
- Speaker: James Albrecht (Georgetown University)
- Date: July 3rd, 2013
- Venue: Room D, 5th Floor (GRIPS)
Paper:
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/vromans/AGVCompetingAuctionsMay2013.pdf
Summary of Paper:
In this paper demonstrates the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations before visiting a seller and the case in which they learn their valuations after visiting the seller. We also allow for seller heterogeneity with respect to reservation values.
In this paper demonstrates the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations before visiting a seller and the case in which they learn their valuations after visiting the seller. We also allow for seller heterogeneity with respect to reservation values.
